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Introduction 
 
In late December of 2003, to the dismay of Kosovar Albanians as well as 
many Serbs, a radical nationalist party with links to former Serbian 
President Slobodan Milosevic won the most votes in Serbia’s national 
election (Abramowitz 2004).  This is just one of many recent events that 
demonstrates the high degree of instability in Serbia, especially within the 
province of Kosovo.  The volatility that today characterizes the Kosovo 
region has its roots in the decade preceding the 1999 Kosovo war, when in 
response to the disintegration of Yugoslavia the international community 
reacted in a confused manner with regards to Kosovo, refusing to 
effectively address the territorial dispute between the ethnic Albanian and 
Serbian populations there.  The 1999 Kosovo war, carried out to stop 
Milosevic’s ethnic-cleansing campaign against Kosovar Albanians, was 
ultimately successful in halting the killings, but failed to resolve the political 
issues behind the fighting - namely, the demands being made by the ethnic 
Albanians for independence of Kosovo on the one hand, versus the Serbian 
insistence on keeping the province as a part of Serbia.  In the four years 
since the war, the international community has maintained a policy of 
postponement and basic disregard for the decision of ‘final status’ for 
Kosovo, which has only served to instill more fear among both opposing 
factions, resulting in a province that is as polarized and unstable as ever.  
This paper will argue that in the three time periods of (1)  the decade before 
the Kosovo war, (2) during the war itself, and (3) in the four years after the 
war, the international community has acted ambiguously and even 
hypocritically regarding the issue of statehood for Kosovo - this being a 
pivotal factor in the prolonging and exacerbation of the conflict.  Behind 
this flawed approach by the international community lies the tension, in 
both international law and practice, between the concepts of nation and 
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state.  This is a tension that, in the case of Kosovo, has resulted in the 
international community’s ongoing indecision over what the final status of 
Kosovo should be, and has left the province in dire need of a solution. 
  
The Theoretical Tension Between ‘Nation’ and ‘State’ 
 
 Before delving into the specifics of the Kosovo conflict, it is 
important to first discuss the concepts of nation and state and the 
theoretical debate that surrounds these two terms.  First of all, according to 
The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, the definition of a nation is 
“…a vague notion which refers to a social collectivity, the members of 
which share some or all of the following: a sense of common identity, a 
history, a language, ethnic or racial origins, religion, a common economic 
life, a geographical location and a political base” (Evans and Newnham 
1998, 343).  As for the definition of a state, it is said to possess “a 
permanent population, a defined territory and a government capable of 
maintaining effective control over its territory and of conducting 
international relations with other states” (Evans and Newnham 1998, 512).  
However, neither of these definitions is absolute.  Regarding a nation, for 
example, none of the criteria are “…either necessary or sufficient for 
definition.  Nations can exist without a distinct political identity (e.g. the 
Jewish nation during the Diaspora) and they can exist without common 
linguistic, cultural, religious or ethnic components (e.g. the Indian nation)” 
(Evans and Newnham 1998, 343).  And regarding a state, it need not 
maintain a defined territory or a government capable of exercising control.  
“Israel, for example, is generally accepted as a state even though the precise 
demarcation of its boundaries has never been settled”, and The Penguin 
Dictionary of International Relations further notes that “…a state does not cease 
to exist when control is in dispute or when it [the government] is 
‘temporarily’ deprived of effective control as in wartime, civil wars, or 
revolutions” (Evans and Newnham 1998, 513). 
 Nevertheless, when there is a fusion of these entities a ‘nation-
state’ is said to exist (Keating and McGarry eds. 2001, 1).  The nation-state 
is classified as “…the dominant political entity of the modern world and as 
such can be considered to be the primary unit of international relations” 
(Evans and Newnham 1998, 343-344).  The concept of a nation-state is a 
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fairly recent one, having its origins in the period following the collapse of 
the Holy Roman Empire and the subsequent “…emergence of the 
centralized state claiming exclusive and monopolistic authority within a 
defined territorial area” (Evans and Newnham 1998, 344).  The Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, recognized as having founded the modern state system, 
marked the intensification of the nation-states’ development.  Then, in what 
is known as ‘the rise of nations’ phenomenon - which was fuelled by anti-
imperialist movements, ethnic conflicts, and secessionist movements - there 
took place a vast expansion in the number of states, from approximately 
two dozen in the late 18th century, to around 200 by the year 2000 
(Ambrosio 2002, 341). 
 Today the nation-state is considered to be not only the ideal, but 
also the most ‘normal,’ political unit (Evans and Newnham 1998, 344).  
However, most nation-states are actually not nearly as ethnically 
homogeneous as what the name implies.  Rather, most of the units that the 
international community calls ‘states’ today are ethnically and culturally 
quite diverse.  Thus in reality, as political scientists Raymond C. Taras and 
Rajat Ganguly note, “The international community…is primarily (but not 
exclusively) a community of states…” rather than pure nation-states (Taras 
and Ganguly 2001, 32).  This is reflected in the fact that in both 
international law and practice there is a strong bias towards states over 
nations (Chesterman, Farer, and Sisk 2000).  For example, for a nation to 
become a member of the United Nations (UN) and thus be recognized as a 
state, it must be a “political entity defined by spatial territorial boundaries.  
Those peoples or groupings who fall outside this rubric (e.g. the Kurds) 
appear therefore not to possess the relevant criteria” (Evans and Newnham 
1998, 343).  Closely related with this are the issues of sovereignty and self-
determination.  Part of the bias currently held by the international 
community towards states is related to the priority given to state 
sovereignty rather than to minority claims for self-determination and other 
actions that could represent the diminishing power of a state (Chesterman, 
Farer, and Sisk 2000).   
 This bias is even reflected in international law documents such as 
Article 8(4) of the UN’s Declaration on Minorities, which consistently 
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repeats the following refrain: “Nothing in the present Declaration may be 
construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and 
political independence of States” (Ambrosio 2002, 348).  When there have 
been attempts made by various international bodies to enhance the rights of 
nations, there has been critical reaction from major states such as Russia, 
China, and India, who are not willing to experience any weakening of their 
sovereignty (Thomas ed. 2003, 4).  Thus, in the current age it is somewhat 
difficult for nations to acquire the status of statehood, as can be seen from 
the numerous ongoing struggles by peoples such as the Chechens, Tamils, 
and of course, the Kosovar Albanians, for legal state recognition.   
 Yet, while this bias toward states is important to note, it is the 
international community’s confused and ambiguous approach towards the 
whole issue that best describes the tension between nations and states.  As 
the previously discussed definitions demonstrate, the terms ‘nation’ and 
‘state’ are laden with ambiguity and imprecision, incapable of specifically 
identifying what the necessary and sufficient criteria are for either of them.  
This confusion is further compounded in international law.  While clauses 
such as the above-mentioned UN Article 8(4) clearly specifies the 
predominance of state sovereignty, there are also documents such as that of 
UN Article 2(5), which not only acknowledges “…the existence of cross-
border nations and the need for members of a national group to maintain 
contacts with their ethnic kin in other countries…” but also has “a nascent 
willingness to move beyond recognition of cultural and linguistic rights, and 
to insist that only enhanced rights of political participation for minorities 
can adequately protect their interests” (Ambrosio 2002, 345).  What 
becomes obvious with this passage that explicitly calls for attention to 
minority groups is the hypocrisy existing in international law.  
Consequently, with no uniform international legal standards to work with, 
the international community confronts a problem when trying to decide 
whether or not to allow a group to be recognized as a state.   
 Many international relations and legal scholars have called for a 
reevaluation of the notions of nation and state.  Specifically, they have 
suggested that the state-centric international system seek to increase the 
accommodation of nations and decrease the bias currently held against, for 
example, ethno-nationalists, and ethno-secessionist movements (Taras and 
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Ganguly 2001, 42).  Perhaps what is needed, some say, is for the model of 
political units to be a ‘multi-ethnic state’ rather than the so-called nation-
state (Evans and Newnham 1998, 344).  The trend of certain states in 
seeking ethnic homogeneity through practices such as creating myths of 
ethnic unity and using ethnic-cleansing - as has occurred in Kosovo for 
example - indeed suggests that a reconceptualization of the concepts of 
nation, state, and especially nation-state, is needed.  And yet others are 
worried that such reassessment could result in a decline in stability and 
order in the international arena (Evans 2001, 8).   
 Thus, what this tension between nation and state demonstrates 
above all is the need for a uniform consensus on these issues in both 
international law and practice.  Consistency among the international 
community’s actions when it comes to dealing with issues of nationality and 
statehood is crucial.  For, without uniformity in practice, situations like that 
of Kosovo needlessly become prolonged and exacerbated conflicts.  Having 
covered the theoretical problem inherent in the notions of nation and state, 
this paper next turns to how that problem has affected the Kosovo conflict, 
beginning with the time period before the 1999 Kosovo war.   
  
Before the War 
 
 The roots of the animosity between the ethnic Albanians and 
Serbians within Kosovo can be traced back many centuries, with the 1389 
Battle of Kosovo serving as a marker for many as the beginning of 
hostilities (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 13).  While in reality that 
battle was probably fought with Albanians and Serbians together on the 
same side, it has been interpreted by the Serbs as an important event in 
their history that demonstrates the significance of the Kosovo land in 
historical, cultural, and religious terms for the Serbian people (Daalder and 
O’Hanlon 2000, 6-7).  Throughout the centuries, such events have been 
mythologized and ultimately misconstrued by both sides, helping to foster 
and facilitate a climate of intolerance and hatred between them.  In fact, the 
groups had created two entirely different and contrasting conceptions of 
history by the 20th century (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 14).  Both 
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claimed not only original inhabitancy of the land, but exclusive rights to it 
as well (Thomas ed. 2003, 65).  In 1912 Serbia gained control of Kosovo - 
after both had been ruled for the past few centuries by the Ottoman 
Empire - only to lose it during World War One.  In the period following 
the war, Kosovo was arbitrarily made a province of Serbia when both were 
incorporated into the newly created state of Yugoslavia.  Unlike in previous 
eras, during the Yugoslav period acts of repression between the two groups 
were kept to a minimum, as the Albanians and Serbians maintained very 
separate communal lives in Kosovo (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 15). 
 As part of Tito’s ‘ethno-national devolution’ attempt, Kosovo was 
granted a great deal of autonomy in the 1974 constitution (Buckley and 
Cummings eds. 2001, 16).  Kosovo’s status was effectively changed from 
provincial to republic, as it was granted all of the same rights that the six 
other Yugoslav republics enjoyed.  It essentially was made a ‘virtual 
republic’ (Caplan 1998, 748).  For example, it was granted equal 
representation in Yugoslav government bodies, as well as its own 
parliament, courts, police force, and national banks (Buckley and 
Cummings eds. 2001, 16).  Constitutionally, however, the Kosovars were 
still lacking the official statehood status that the other republics had, and 
thus the period from 1974 to the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1989 witnessed 
Albanian demands for greater autonomy.  These demands, as well as the 
fact that the Albanian birth rate in Kosovo was significantly higher than 
that of the Serbs (by the 1990’s Kosovo consisted of 90% Albanians), led 
not only to increasing resentment on the part of the Serbs, but more 
importantly to a growing sense of nationalism among them as well (Thomas 
ed. 2003, 65).  When Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic came onto the 
political scene in the late 1980’s he was able to manipulate and capitalize on 
this Serbian self-identity movement, eventually stripping away all of 
Kosovo’s autonomy by 1990 (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 8).  In the 
period between the dissolving of the province’s powers and the outbreak of 
the Kosovo war, the ethnic Albanians suffered extensive human rights 
abuses under the rule of Milosevic’s nationalist government (Abrahams 
2000). 
 The international community realized very early that Kosovo was 
essentially a ‘powder keg’ ready to erupt into violence at any moment during 
the 1990’s (Schnabel and Thakur 2000, 7).  In spite of that, international 
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bodies and governments largely ignored the situation and acted incoherently 
and inconsistently during the few times that attention was paid to the 
region.  The confused international reaction to the Kosovo situation was 
first demonstrated when various republics within Yugoslavia began to claim 
their independence; Kosovo was included in this movement when it 
declared the Republic of Kosova in 1991.  After Slovenia and Croatia had 
proclaimed their autonomy, the European Community (now the European 
Union, or EU) established the Badinter Commission, which had the task of 
examining the legal status of the various entities of the dissolving Yugoslav 
federation.  In late 1991 the Commission declared that “Yugoslavia was ‘in 
the process of dissolution’ and that the republics seeking independence 
were therefore not rebel entities but… ‘new states…created on the territory 
of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]’” (Caplan 
1998, 747).  What this consequently implied for the international 
community was that support could therefore be given to these new states, 
as they were not technically seceding - an act considered to be in opposition 
of the UN Charter (Caplan 1998, 747).  For Kosovo, however, no support 
could be granted, as it had never officially been given republic status, even 
though in all aspects other than title it was considered to be a republic.  As 
author Richard Caplan notes, “were it not for an arcane constitutional 
principle Kosovo might very well have been a republic” (Caplan 1998, 747).  
While the quite arbitrary distinctions between republics and provinces had 
been made during the communist era, the international community deemed 
such demarcations to be easy and hassle-free determinants of statehood.  
Thus, extremely multi-ethnic states such as Bosnia were granted 
independence, while Kosovo, a very ethnically homogenous unit, was 
denied state status (Taras and Ganguly 2001, 259). 
 What essentially developed then within the Kosovo territory was a 
‘parallel state’ structure (Thomas ed. 2003, 65).  Having lost its parliament, 
constitution, and basically all state functions in 1990, and then being denied 
independence in1991, the Kosovar Albanians built up numerous parallel 
state institutions that quite successfully addressed areas such as health care, 
education, and social assistance (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 18).  
Kosovar Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of 
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Kosovo encouraged this parallel state arrangement in the hope of proving 
Kosovo’s ability to operate as a state to the international community.  
Rugova furthermore preached non-violence to his subjects, determined not 
to give the Serbs an excuse to attempt to expel or exterminate the 
Albanians.  Rugova was sure that this ‘good behavior,’ together with the 
results of a referendum - which had proven that an overwhelming majority 
of Kosovars wanted independence - would coalesce into the eventual 
granting of autonomy (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 18).  However, 
his efforts were of no avail, as not only was there no recognition of 
independence, but the international community seemed to have forgotten 
about the plight of Kosovo altogether.  For example, despite the fact that 
many analysts of the Yugoslav conflict had recognized that any peace 
agreements made would have to comprehensively address the issue of 
national minorities throughout the entire former Yugoslavia, the Dayton 
Agreement that was signed in 1995 to end the Bosnian war dealt with no 
such issue (Caplan 1998, 750).  In fact, Kosovo was not discussed to any 
significant degree in the accords.  This was largely done because it was 
thought, especially by the American and Western European governments, 
that doing so would push Milosevic too far after he had just ‘cooperated’ in 
the Dayton peace process (Caplan 1998, 750).  Furthermore, because there 
was no overt violence in the Kosovo region - mainly due to Rugova’s 
peaceful resistance tactics - the international community felt there to be no 
urgent need to tackle the problems there (Thomas ed. 2003, 65). 
 As a result of so little constructive attention given to the repression 
being suffered by the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Rugova’s non-violent 
tactics were abandoned.  Realizing that there could be no improvement in 
the situation as long as Kosovo remained a low priority for American and 
European policy-makers, many Albanians turned to violence to not only 
fend off the Serbs, but more importantly, to gain the attention of the world 
community (Abrahams 2000).  The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) gained 
prominence and was soon engaged in aggressive hostilities against Serb 
authorities.  Needless to say, the violence level in Kosovo began to 
dramatically escalate.  The international community did take some notice, 
and several measures were taken to curb Serbian criminal behavior.  Yet, 
efforts were only half-hearted and foreign governments and bodies still 
refused to see Kosovo as anything but an integral component of the state 
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of Serbia (Thomas ed. 2003, 65).  As a result of this outlook, any action 
taken by the international community towards Kosovo was focused not on 
the underlying political issues such as self-determination or national rights, 
but rather on simply protecting human rights (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 
9).  Consequently, it was not until a brutal March 1998 Serbian massacre of 
Albanians in which eighty-five people were murdered did groups such as 
NATO seriously consider taking overt action against the Milosevic regime 
in Kosovo (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 11). 
 Thus, during the time period leading-up to the international 
community’s 1998 consideration of directing actual force against the 
Serbian perpetrators, it is quite apparent that the flawed and ambiguous 
concepts of nation and state had a negative affect on international behavior.  
Since there was no precise and definitive legal norms with regards to when 
a nation - such as the ethnic Albanians - should be granted the right to form 
their own state, action taken by foreign governments and international 
bodies was incoherent.  The Kosovar Albanians were granted different 
status - for arbitrary reasons - in comparison to the other national groups 
within the dissolving federation, and this different treatment proved to be a 
key factor in the continuation and escalation of hostilities (Caplan 1998, 
746).  For example, after watching the international community refuse to 
ratify borders to create an independent Kosovo, but then watching the 
violent parties involved in the Bosnian conflict being granted permission to 
change their boundaries, many ethnic Albanians drew the conclusion that, 
as the editor-in-chief of the Pristina daily, Koha Ditore, said, “international 
attention can only be obtained through war” (Caplan 1998, 752).  
Consequently, non-violent tactics were shelved in favor of the violent 
strategies of the militarily-oriented pro-separatist KLA, and as a result, 
hostilities in Kosovo worsened.   
 Hence, it becomes evident that if there is to be any sort of adequate 
response by the international community to conflicts involving statehood 
and national issues, a uniform consensus on the subjects of nation and state 
is needed in both international law and practice.  The need for this is seen 
equally as strongly in the period surrounding the Kosovo war, to which this 
paper turns to next. 
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During the War 
 
 As previously mentioned, the March 1998 massacre signaled to the 
United States (US) and Western European governments that they would 
have to take substantial action to halt the hostilities in the province.  Even 
so, international efforts at first were disjointed and ineffective.  The US 
took the initiative, sending to Belgrade ‘special representative for the 
implementation of the Dayton Agreement,’ Robert S. Gelbard (Buckley and 
Cummings eds. 2001, 19).  In determining the situation within Kosovo, 
Gelbard actually arrived at a positive assessment of the Serbian regime, 
praising Milosevic for his peacemaking efforts in the Dayton process.  Not 
only was a reduction in Serbian sanctions suggested, but much to the Serbs’ 
delight, on Gelbard’s visit to the Kosovo capital of Pristina he said that the 
KLA “is, without any question, a terrorist group”, and furthermore, that the 
US “condemns very strongly terrorist activities in Kosovo” (Caplan 1998, 
753).  Essentially having given Serbian authorities a legitimate pretext to 
launch attacks on these ‘terrorists,’ Milosevic thus began a Serbian offensive 
a week after Gelbard’s visit.  Secretary-General of the ruling Serbian 
Socialist Party, Gorica Gajevic, explained the ensuing burning and looting 
of Albanian villages, the executions, and the general brutality when he said, 
“Serbia will fight terrorism the same way the rest of the world does” 
(Caplan 1998, 754). 
 The hostilities in turn stimulated more support for the KLA, and 
thousands of ethnic Albanians joined the fight.  Attitudes like that of Adem 
Demaci, leader of one of Kosovo’s strongest political parties, became 
common: “I will not condemn the tactics of the [KLA] because the path of 
nonviolence has gotten us nowhere…The [KLA] is fighting for our 
freedom” (Caplan 1998, 752).  By June 1998, with a full-fledged 
insurrectionary war taking place, not only had over 350 people been killed 
in the fighting but approximately 60,000 Kosovars had become refugees, 
many having fled into Albania (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 19).  The 
potential destabilization of the broader region that refugees could cause, 
together with dramatic media coverage of the atrocities, helped to stimulate 
a somewhat more effective, though still not totally adequate, response from 
the international community (Pavkovic 2000, 191). 
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 The International Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia which 
included the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia, finally 
condemned the Serbians’ “use of excessive force by [their] police against 
civilians” (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 20).  The UN Security Council 
shortly thereafter passed Resolution 1160 which placed an arms embargo 
on the region.  After that there were an additional series of diplomatic 
measures, culminating with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 in 
September 1998, which called for “immediate action” to halt the fighting in 
Kosovo which had by that time produced 200,000 refugees (Schnabel and 
Thakur 2000, 12-13).  Almost immediately following the resolution, NATO 
began to plan for military action, and negotiations were attempted between 
Milosevic and American Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke.  The 
October 1998 agreement that Holbrooke eventually managed to secure with 
Milosevic was faulty on many levels.  First of all, it simply demanded that 
Serbs revert to the police and military levels that had existed prior to 
February 1998 (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 21).  This was not only 
an extremely generous condition for the Serbian authorities but, more 
importantly, it failed to address the root cause of the Kosovo crisis, which 
of course was the political status of Kosovo.  Furthermore, the agreement 
was signed without the support of the KLA, making it a one-sided peace 
settlement (Buckley and Cummings eds. 2001, 21).  Predictably, the so-
called peace did not last long and by February 1999 new peace talks, co-
chaired by British and French Foreign Ministers, were being held in 
Rambouillet, France.  On March 20, after the talks had been suspended 
because of a walkout by the Serb delegation, a major Serb offensive was 
launched in Kosovo, which finally prompted NATO to begin its bombing 
campaign on March 24. 
 The main objectives of the air strikes were to force Milosevic ‘back 
to the negotiating table’ and thereby halt a humanitarian catastrophe 
(Schnabel and Thakur 2000, 13).  NATO’s expectation that this would 
simply take a few days was reflected in its willingness to only take limited 
actions and its decision to, for example, rule out the use of ground force 
(Evans 2001, 6).  However, Milosevic immediately began a brutal policy of 
ethnic-cleansing that by the end of the seventy-eight day war had resulted in 
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850,000 ethnic Albanian refugees, between 300,000-400,000 internally 
displaced people within Kosovo, and approximately 10,000 killed 
(Abrahams 2000).  Although it took much more time and effort than 
NATO had anticipated, by June 1999, NATO had managed to convince 
Serb commanders to withdraw military forces from Kosovo.  Peace was 
formally instigated on June 10 by UN Security Council Resolution 1244.  
NATO itself considered the war to have been a great achievement: a 
successful air campaign that achieved the original objectives, and low losses 
of life in terms of both civilian casualties and NATO personnel (Daalder 
and O’Hanlon 2000, 4-5).  
 While cessation of hostilities and limited casualties are definitely 
commendable achievements, the Kosovo war was nevertheless deeply 
flawed in many respects.  The most obvious failure was NATO’s inability to 
avert Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign, mainly the result of NATO 
doing too little, too late.  Furthermore, there were some governments who 
were very wary of not only the fact that NATO went ahead with its mission 
despite no UN backing, but also that such activity could set dangerous 
precedents.  One Indian newspaper captured this sentiment when it printed, 
“NATO aggression on Yugoslavia: Today Kosovo, Tomorrow Kashmir?” 
(Ambrosio 2002, 349)  However, the most major failure, and the one to 
cause the most serious repercussions, was the lack of attention paid to 
finding a political solution for the territory.  Professors A.J.R. Groom and 
Paul Taylor describe this mistake by saying, “it is dangerous to base action 
on axiomatic principles without reflection.  Insisting on no partition, no 
independence, enforced multi-ethnicity, and no questioning of borders 
imposed constraints on the possibilities of compromise” (Schnabel and 
Thakur 2000, 38).  Although NATO had planned to address governing 
arrangements following the war - and its inadequate attempts to do so will 
be discussed later in this paper - no serious consideration during this time 
period was given to what the territorial status of Kosovo should be.    
 This can be seen in the contradictory statements made by the 
American government, for example.  In the week before the 
commencement of the NATO air strikes, then-US President Bill Clinton 
stated, “With our NATO allies and with Russia, we proposed a peace 
agreement to stop the killing and give the people of Kosovo the self-
determination and government they need and to which they are entitled 
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under the constitution of their government” (Ambrosio 2002, 344-345).  
This statement would seem to suggest American support for the self-
determination of the ethnic Albanian people, and therefore their right to 
statehood.  However, in numerous other addresses, the issues of self-
determination and state status were altogether left out.  For example, in 
Clinton’s speech to his country regarding the initiation of NATO bombing 
he said, 
  
“Our strikes have three objectives.  First, to demonstrate the 
seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression and its support for 
peace.  Second, to deter President Milosevic from continuing and 
escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for 
those attacks.  And third, if necessary, to damage Serbia’s capacity to 
wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its 
military capabilities” (Ambrosio 2002, 347). 
  
In one address to the Serbian people, in fact, Clinton declared, “the 
NATO allies support the desire of the Serbian people to maintain Kosovo 
as part of your country” (Ambrosio 2002, 347).  And both during the war 
and immediately afterwards, Secretary of State Madeline Albright as well as 
State Department spokesman James Rubin claimed on behalf of the US that 
“we have always said we do not support independence for Kosovo, and we 
do not support independence for Kosovo now” (Ambrosio 2002, 347). 
 Such contradictory statements were echoed in UN Security Council 
resolutions, which had the tendency to stress ‘self-administration’ and ‘self-
government’ for the Kosovar people, but not ‘self-determination’ 
(Ambrosio 2002, 347).  Thus, in combination with the actions taken by the 
international community in the decade before the Kosovo war - in 
particular the arbitrary recognition of some former Yugoslav states but not 
others - together with the contradictory messages to the Kosovar people 
during the war regarding what their political status would be, an impression 
of an incapable and arbitrary international system was allowed to develop.  
And indeed, the international system in this respect is arbitrary.  Without a 
clear formula of how to address crises involving self-determination, 
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nationality, and statehood, any action taken by the international community 
will both appear and will be illogical and hypocritical.  And the consequence 
of this confused system, for conflicts like Kosovo, is that no quick and 
adequate resolution will take place.  This is demonstrated nowhere more 
obviously than in the time period immediately after the war and to the 
present day in Kosovo - a topic which this paper will now discuss. 
  
Following the War 
 
 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that was passed at the end of 
the Kosovo war not only formally marked the end of the fighting, but also 
established stipulations for the province to be run as a joint UN and NATO 
Yugoslav protectorate, as opposed to being strictly under Belgrade’s 
control.  A UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was 
arranged to ‘constitute the transitional administration for the region’ (Taras 
and Ganguly 2001, 253).  UNMIK’s principle areas of focus include police 
and justice, civil administration, democratization and institution building, 
and reconstruction and economic development (Abrahams 2000).  Several 
other bodies, such as the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe play fundamental roles in the operation of those tasks 
as well.  The resolution also established a Kosovo Peacekeeping Force 
(KFOR) consisting of soldiers from various NATO countries.  KFOR’s 
nearly 40,000 troops are centered in five main areas of the province with 
the responsibility of ‘keeping the peace’ (Abrahams 2000).  While 
Resolution 1244 was important in that it provided for both a provisional 
method of governing Kosovo as well as a temporary means to ensure 
peace, it neglected to address the future final status of Kosovo (Buckley and 
Cummings eds. 2001, 26-27).  This has made UNMIK’s governing of the 
province difficult, as well as KFOR’s task of guaranteeing security and 
stability.  Ultimately, this has proven to be the factor most responsible for 
the continuing unrest within the province. 
 UNMIK and KFOR did share some immediate success in 
providing for the safe return of nearly all of the 1.3 million ethnic Albanian 
refugees who had been displaced during Milosevic’s rule (Daalder and 
O’Hanlon 2000, 4).  However, neither of them proved capable of 
preventing the expulsion from Kosovo of over 250,000 non-Albanians - 
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mostly Serbs and Roma - by KLA revenge attacks (Schnabel and Thakur 
2000, 13).  Since 1999 the track record of both UNMIK and KFOR has 
been mixed at best.  On the positive side, the level of violence within 
Kosovo has decreased tenfold since 1999, the province operates its own 
police force and judiciary, and Milosevic is currently on trial for war crimes 
in the Hague (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 16).  However, the pressing 
reality is that today the lack of a consensus on a final status and the 
consequent unresolved animosity and tension between the ethnic Albanians 
and Serbians within Kosovo has turned the political situation into a zero-
sum game: the majority Albanians will now accept no less than 
independence, and the minority Serbians remain steadfast in their demand 
to be a part of Serbia (International Crisis Group 2003).  With little sign that 
the international community will be addressing Kosovo’s permanent 
political status anytime soon, the ethnic Albanians and Serbs grow more 
suspicious and distrustful of each other by the day, and ultimately 
increasingly fearful of the future (Price 2003, 2). 
 The lack of clarity regarding Kosovo’s status has hurt its 
development in other ways as well.  The Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP), the principal instrument in preparing Balkan states for 
incorporation into the EU, has been instrumental in guiding the states 
around Kosovo towards integration into the European community (United 
States Institute of Peace 2002, 2).  However, SAP requires its subjects to be 
sovereign states, and thus Kosovo is unable to participate, making it very 
likely that it will soon be ‘left behind’ politically and economically (United 
States Institute of Peace 2002, 2).  Kosovo’s economic situation is further 
hindered by the fact that few foreign investors wish to become involved in 
the region.  The unclear status of Kosovo and its unpromising future 
severely discourages any kind of foreign economic involvement or 
investment in the province.  This has resulted in poor economic conditions 
characterized by statistics such as a 60% unemployment rate (Price 2003, 2).  
With regards to Kosovo’s political condition, its governmental development 
is being compromised by UNMIK procedures.  ‘Standards before status’ is 
the policy at the heart of UNMIK operations (Abramowitz 2003).  That 
essentially equates to Kosovo having to meet certain ‘benchmarks’ before 
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being able to govern itself (United States Institute of Peace 2002, 3).  
However, these benchmarks are conditions few other Balkan states have 
even come close to achieving, and thus the expectation that Kosovo, with 
its already extremely limited powers, should meet these goals before being 
granted the institutions of self-governance is highly unfair.  Moreover, no 
adequate plans or programs have been developed to help Kosovars reach 
the benchmarks, nor have assessments been completed regarding any 
progress made (Abramowitz 2003).  Kosovars are as a result very frustrated, 
especially with the fact that UNMIK still has principal control over political 
arenas like the constitution, the calling of elections, and foreign affairs 
(United States Institute of Peace 2002, 3). 
 UMMIK has responded by stressing that sovereignty and 
statehood are merely symbolic issues (International Crisis Group 2003).  
Yet it is clear in the case of Kosovo that political matters are far from 
simply symbolic and are instead considered pivotal issues by Kosovo’s 
people (International Crisis Group 2003).  As previously (though briefly) 
mentioned, while the level of overt violence within Kosovo has decreased, 
societal conditions remain very poor.  The situation of the Serbs within 
Kosovo, for example, is coming to mirror that of the ethnic Albanians 
during the 1990’s.  The Serbs - and frequently the Roma as well - are 
restricted from freely using their languages, are deprived of access to many 
Kosovar institutions, and attacks towards them by Albanians are quite 
common (Matic 2004).  These conditions have two negative effects: firstly, 
they encourage the Serbs and Roma to settle in isolated enclaves away from 
the ethnic Albanians, thus creating a very polarized state, and secondly, the 
Serbs’ and Roma’s perceptions that UNMIK and KFOR are poorly 
providing for their safety in the face of such atrocities drives them to 
support radical nationalist Serbian parties (Matic 2004).  As Simbad, a 
Roma, explained, “We are locked up in this village and I’m sure the Radicals 
are the only ones who can help us regain all the freedoms we lost after 
1999” (Matic 2004).  Attitudes like that help to explain why the Serbian 
Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj who is currently on trial in the Hague, 
won the most seats in Serbia’s December 2003 national election (Cvijanovic 
2004).  The support of Kosovar Serbs and Roma for such radical politics is 
unlikely to wane as long as final status is put off and the fear among the 
groups is allowed to fester. 
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 Balkan experts and academics have discussed and advocated 
various solutions to Kosovo’s continuing problems.  To begin with, it is 
virtually unanimously agreed upon that the West must not delay the 
decision over Kosovo’s final status any longer (International Crisis Group 
2002a).  Not only has this interim protectorate condition proven itself 
unworkable, but the lack of long-term planning for the province is 
discouraging development in economic, political, and societal terms.  What 
this equates to is the need for dedicated and constructive assistance from 
the international community (Price 2003, 3).  UNMIK must, for example, 
either disregard the benchmark program or make the goals more realistic 
and explicitly demonstrate their linkage with obtaining self-government.  
UNMIK must also be willing to hand-over more powers to the Kosovo 
people in order to prepare them for some kind of self-government 
(Abramowitz 2003).  Furthermore, unless willing to become actively 
involved, the international community must stop their insistence that 
Kosovo and the Serbian government hold negotiations (Abramowitz 2003).  
Kosovo has no real powers of its own at the moment, whereas Serbia is a 
full-fledged state.  It is important that the two parties have dialogue, and 
indeed there are many issues that need to be discussed, but unless 
negotiations are conducted on fair terms they simply serve as fodder for 
extremist attitudes.   
 Moreover, the international community must think in more 
proactive rather than reactive terms.  This means, for example, 
strengthening KFOR to be able to prevent conflict from erupting on the 
Albanian and Macedonian borders, as the upsurge in extremism among 
both the Kosovar Albanians and Serbians has increased the likelihood that 
the broader region will become destabilized (Greenberg 2001, 3).  And 
while KFOR and UNMIK were too slow in reacting to the expulsion of 
Serbs from the province after the war, they can now act proactively by 
providing a safe environment for their return.  A major boost in ethnic 
relations could occur not only if more of the Serbs were allowed to come 
back to their homes, but if they were able to do so in an atmosphere of 
security and hospitality (International Crisis Group 2002c). 
 These are just some of many measures needed to be taken by the 
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international community if Kosovo is to see any progress.  What these 
measures all stem from, however, is the need to address the final status 
issue.  In one means or another, all problematic matters in Kosovo are 
related to the lack of clarity regarding the province’s future.  Even the 
return of Serbian refugees, for example, has been politicized to such an 
extent because of Kosovo’s unresolved status that it makes it highly unlikely 
that the more than 190,000 remaining displaced people will return home 
anytime soon (Avidiu and Vujisic 2003, 3).  While there is at the moment no 
clear consensus on what exactly Kosovo’s political status should become - 
whether it should be partitioned, be granted autonomy with Serbia, be given 
full independence, and so on - there is an acknowledgment among most 
scholars that at least some autonomy is vital for Kosovo, in addition to a 
democratic and ethnically representative government (International Crisis 
Group 2002b).  The International Crisis Group, in its recent report on 
Kosovo, suggested that the province be granted ‘Conditional 
Independence’ which they described as “…a way out of the impasse” 
(International Crisis Group 2002a).  Conditional independence “…would 
allow the international community to retain essential influence over local 
Albanian leaders.  Having secured independence from Belgrade, but 
remaining on probation, the Kosovo Albanians would have a strong 
incentive to ensure that Kosovo would cease to be a factor of regional 
instability” (International Crisis Group 2002a).  Because this option both 
grants autonomy to the ethnic Albanians, but at the same time makes that 
autonomy conditional upon ‘good behavior’ - especially in the field of 
ensuring fair treatment to the Serbs - this is perhaps the most viable 
alternative suggested to date. 
 Even more important than the political design of Kosovo, 
however, is that it simply be decided upon soon.  The stakes are clearly too 
high for the decision to be held off any longer; the conflict has already been 
too prolonged and exacerbated.  There are a range of factors holding the 
international community back from addressing final status: fear of opening 
‘Pandora’s Box’ to a multitude of future secessionist movements, for 
example, and a simple decline in interest in the region since the end of the 
war (United States Institute of Peace 2002).   Yet the primary reason comes 
from the international community’s confusion over the concepts of nation 
and state, as well as the related issues of self-determination and sovereignty.  
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As mentioned before, with a lack of clarity and established consensus over 
when a nation should be granted the right to form its own state, foreign 
governments and international bodies are left searching for adequate 
answers.  Their grappling for a solution to Kosovo’s final status is directly 
the result of the ambiguous, arbitrary, and hypocritical characteristics of the 
nation and state dilemma in international law and practice. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 Commenting on the numerous international conflicts of the 1990’s, 
former Australian Foreign Minister and leader of the International Crisis 
Group, Garth Evans, said, “If we’ve learned anything from these 
catastrophes that have haunted us throughout the 1990s, it is that they 
haven’t occurred like conventional wars demanding conventional military 
responses” (Evans 2001, 7).   Indeed, Kosovo was - and still is - an example 
of one of those catastrophes that called for new approaches to the art of 
conflict management - NATO’s bombing campaign being a prime example 
of that.  However, what Kosovo desperately needed was a unified and 
effective response from the international community.  Due to the lack of a 
clear and formulated consensus on nationality and statehood issues, none 
came.  Before and during the Kosovo war, despite attitudes like that of 
former Dutch foreign minister Willem Van Eekelen who asked, “…why 
make a difference in principle between, say, Slovenia and Kosovo when 
fundamental human rights are being crushed?”, arbitrary decisions were 
made regarding the political status of Kosovo that helped in numerous ways 
to extend the conflict (Caplan 1998, 761).  Since then, “the war with bombs 
has ended but not the political war”, as newspaper editor Veton Surroi 
explained, and the province is still awaiting its long-due status decision 
(International Crisis Group 2003).  If there is to be any hope of ending the 
international community’s practice of prolonging and exacerbating the 
Kosovo crisis, or of putting a stop to the violence in the Balkan Peninsula 
in general, the tension between nations and states will have to resolved.  It 
remains to be seen whether this issue that has been pestering international 
politics for so long will be put to a rest in time to save Kosovo. 
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